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Abstract
The Nordic countries constitute an interesting laboratory for the study of differentiated European Integration. Even though
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share some historical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteris-
tics, all those countries have ultimately opted for a different kind of relationship with the EU. Whereas Finland, a member
of the Eurozone since its inception in 1999, has been considered to be part of the Union’s ‘inner core’ for quite some
time, Iceland and Norway, in contrast, have opted to remain outside the EU albeit closely associated via the European
Economic Area Agreement. The variation of relationships has also been reflected in Nordic parties’ positioning vis-à-vis
European integration in general and differentiation of European integration in particular. Broadly speaking, party fami-
lies can be distinguished along traditional (e.g., agrarian, Christian democratic, conservative, and social democratic) and
modern (e.g., socialist left, green, and populist radical right) ideological orientations. Although political parties belonging
to both the traditional and modern Nordic party families have adopted different stances on European differentiated in-
tegration, we would assume—against the backdrop of Nordic cooperation—higher levels of transnational cooperation in
European matters. Consequently, this article examines the similarities and differences between parties belonging to the
same ideological family, and the extent of transnational party cooperation in the Nordic countries. Drawing on a series of
interviews conducted with party representatives as well as on official party documents, this article shows that although
institutionalized party cooperation mostly reflects divisions between party families, such institutionalization does not in-
clude a common vision for European integration. We conclude that the low level of partisan Nordic integration is primarily
caused by domestic-level factors, such as intra-party divisions, government participation and public opinion.
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1. Introduction
For a long time, the Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—have been broadly per-
ceived as “a linguistic, cultural, economic, social, and
political-ideological area, of considerable homogeneity”
(Andrén, 1967, pp. 8–9). Clearly, this perception has
been reinforced by the fact that post-World War II
Nordic cooperation predated the establishment of the
European Community in 1957. In 1952 already, inter-
parliamentary cooperation was formalized in the Nordic
Council. The Council encompassed parliamentary repre-
sentatives from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden as well as the autonomous areas of the Faroe
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Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands. In 1971, in-
tergovernmental cooperation amongst the Nordic coun-
tries was eventually supplemented by the creation of the
Nordic Council of Ministers. Whereas Nordic cooperation
failed in advancing cooperation towards a Scandinavian
defense and economic union in the 1950s, it produced
some remarkable successes in the field of passport-free
travel and integration of labor markets. In July 1954,
the Nordic labor market was established and four years
later, building upon the passport-free travel area of 1952,
the Nordic Passport Union came into place. These mea-
sures helped ensure that citizens of the Nordic countries
were able to move and establish themselves freely in
this area. Subsequently, a Nordic Convention on Social
Security was endorsed and there were even ideas for
creating a single market amongst the countries. Yet,
they were abandoned in 1959 when Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden decided to join the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA), which was founded in 1960 and eventually
joined by Finland one year later. EFTA was character-
ized by a strong injection of Scandinavian countries with
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which were joined by
Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Together with the United Kingdom, the economic center
of the EFTA, Denmark and Norway agreed to seek full
membership in the European Community at the begin-
ning of the 1960s. Eventually, Denmark became a mem-
ber of the EC in 1973—whereas a popular referendum in
Norway produced a majority opposing EC membership.
Subsequently, Finland and Sweden became EU members
in 1995, while the Norwegian population voted against
membership in 1994 yet again, and Iceland only briefly
considered joining the EU as a response to the global fi-
nancial crisis in 2009. These different approaches have
been explained by the varying political influence of indus-
trial sectors across the five countries (Ingebritsen, 1998),
the historical relevance of national sovereignty, auton-
omy and self-determination (Hansen & Wæver, 2002),
the existence of an influent Eurosceptic base among the
population (Raunio, 2007) as well as political constraints
imposed by the post-World War II geopolitical context of
the Nordic as well as Baltic region (Hubel, 2004). Thus,
with regards to the EU, the Nordic countries have al-
ways had a tumultuous relationship with it, prompting
Miljan (1977) to name them ‘reluctant Europeans,’ while
StegmannMcCallion andBrianson (2018) refer to themas
‘awkward partners’ in the North. Yet, this does not mean
that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
share a common vision on European integration either.
Until fairly recently, the literature on party prefer-
ences towards the EU has mostly focused on views on
membership (see e.g., Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier,
2005). But the diverse responses to agreements between
states and the EU occurring in the 1990s have eventu-
ally made the membership/non-membership dichotomy
obsolete, also among the Nordic countries (Egeberg &
Trondal, 1999). As demonstrated by Denmark’s opt-outs
of the Maastricht Treaty and Sweden de facto opting out
of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) following a set of national referendums, EU mem-
bership no longer means full participation in the process
of European integration. Similarly, just as there are many
‘shades’ of qualified Euroscepticism (Leruth, Startin, &
Usherwood, 2018), analyzing support or opposition to
Europe requires one to have a look at the policy-area
level rather than on the EU as a whole. As Europe has be-
come an increasingly tangible issue in national politics,
this article contributes to the study of European differ-
entiation (Gänzle, Leruth, & Trondal, 2020) and Nordic
cooperation (Stie & Trondal, 2020) with data exploring
the role of political parties on the politics of European
integration (Mair, 2007).
This article examines Nordic party positions on
European differentiation, i.e., the general mode of in-
tegration (or disintegration) processes and strategies
that exist within the EU (Stubb, 1996). Most particu-
larly, it assesses the similarities and differences of such
positions within party families, given the historical rel-
evance of the Nordic party structure (see Berglund &
Lindström, 1978). Eight party families can be identified:
the six traditional—i.e., Conservative, Liberal, Agrarian,
Social Democratic, Socialist Left (formerly Communists),
and Christian Democrat—families, to which the Greens
and Populist Radical Right can be added as a result of
their increasing relevance since the early 1990s. This
study relies on a content analysis of party manifestos
released during general election campaigns held be-
tween 1990 and 2010, and draws on thirty-four semi-
structured interviews conducted by the lead author. The
interviews were held with high-level party representa-
tives (members of parliament, existing/former ministers,
existing/former party leaders) and party advisors in all
five Nordic countries between 2011 and 2014 in the
aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis
of 2007/2008 and in the midst of the Eurozone crisis.
Interviewees were asked about their respective party’s
positions on differentiation and the level of transnational
cooperation with their Nordic counterparts on the mat-
ter (Leruth, 2014). In terms of research design, four pol-
icy areas close to the “core state powers” (Genschel &
Jachtenfuchs, 2014) have been identified in these inter-
views: the European Economic Area (EEA) affiliation or
full EU membership; the EMU; the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (AFSJ); and the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). The interviews were conducted in
the early years of Europe’s polycrisis (i.e., before the so-
called migration crisis and the Brexit vote) but at a time
when the issue of European integrationwas heavily politi-
cized, especially in Iceland (in the context of the country’s
application for EU membership), Sweden, and Finland
(given the rapid rise of Eurosceptic parties in both coun-
tries). This analysis could thus pave the way for future
analyses of the lasting impact of the polycrisis on Nordic
party positions towards European integration.
As the analysis covers 35 parties divided into eight
party families across five countries, the article’s main ob-
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jective is to offer a set of comparative accounts to de-
termine whether belonging to a party family shapes a
party’s position on European integration. An in-depth
analysis of the causes and consequences of party co-
operation (or lack thereof) on European integration in
Finland, Norway, and Sweden based on part of this ma-
terial has been written by Leruth (2014). This article
shows that although institutionalized party cooperation
mostly reflects divisions between party families, such in-
stitutionalization does not include a common vision for
European integration. It is argued that specific internal
factors, such as intra-party divisions, public opinion, or
participation in government can explain such divisions
within existing party families. In sum, the study docu-
ments a surprisingly low level of partisan Nordic integra-
tion, primarily caused by domestic-level factors.
2. The Nordic Countries as ‘Models’ of Integration
The early 1990s saw the establishment and institution-
alization of differentiated mechanisms of integration in
the EU. Both the United Kingdom and Denmark, through
their opposition towards some aspects of theMaastricht
Treaty (albeit for diverging reasons), are considered as
the pioneers of differentiation. Altogether four ‘models’
of integration that are championed by Nordic countries
are discernible in the literature (see Leruth, Gänzle, &
Trondal, 2019).
Most prominently, the ‘EEA’ or ‘Norwegian Model,’
which was the subject of much discussion and debate
as a potential model for the United Kingdom follow-
ing the 2016 Brexit vote, allows a non-member state
of the EU to maintain a very close relationship—“quasi-
membership” in the words of Lavenex (2004, p. 684)—
with the Union through a dense web of institutional-
ized relations (e.g., Fossum & Graver, 2018). In addi-
tion to Norway, this model also embraces Iceland and
Liechtenstein as non-EU members. As part of this re-
lationship, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway get full
access to the Single Market. In return, they are ex-
empted from participation in policy areas such as the
Common Agricultural Policy and are expected to only
implement the EEA-relevant share of EU legislation.
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway are also exempted
from having a formal say and influence in the decision-
making process of EU institutions—a consequence of
non-membership which has been coined as ‘fax democ-
racy’ by some (pro-EU) Norwegian interviewees. Even
though initially designed as a temporary form of integra-
tion, which would eventually pave the way for full EU
membership, this model of differentiation has now be-
come permanent, with both Norway and Iceland seek-
ing to maintain the status quo rather than EU member-
ship or any fundamental reforms to their existing rela-
tionship with the EU (Fossum&Graver, 2018). Moreover,
because the EU at the time of negotiation in the early
1990s assumed the ´EEA model’ to be a merely tempo-
rary arrangement, the agreement was designed fairly fa-
vorable to the EEA countries, for example by granting bu-
reaucrats from EEA countries participatory rights in the
decision-shaping committees of the Commission and the
Council as well as the establishment of a parallel bespoke
institutional construction. This idea was launched early
by Jacques Delors in the EEA negotiations as “common
decision-making and administration institutions” which
would serve as a separate EEA decision-making structure
between the EU and EFTA. However, this arrangement
was for constitutional and political reasons reduced from
“decision-making” structures to “decision-shaping” struc-
tures during the EEA negotiations (Wade & Støren, 2019,
pp. 111–112).
The ‘Danish model’ can be considered as a form of
quasi-permanent differentiation. As a response to a neg-
ative referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty, the majority of Danish political parties prepared
a compromise document which will ultimately be re-
flected in the so-called Edinburgh Agreement of 1992.
This Agreement granted a series of permanent opt-outs
of the Maastricht Treaty to Denmark with regards to
participation in the third stage of the EMU, justice and
home affairs, and the common security and defense pol-
icy, subject to the eventual ratification of the Treaty via a
second referendum. Since the implementation of these
opt-outs, however, successive Danish governments have
been trying to transform some of these opt-outs into
‘opt-ins,’ as the model was deemed to ultimately harm
Danish influence and interests (see e.g., Danish Institute
for International Studies, 2008). Yet, such attempts were
rebuked by the Danish population in two referendums
held in 2000 (on joining the Eurozone) and 2015 (on AFSJ-
related opt-outs). As such, and despite successive gov-
ernments’ opposition towards some of these opt-outs,
the Danish model has become quasi-permanent.
The ‘Swedish model’ is legally complex as Sweden
does not have any formal opt-outs of EU policies and
is thus de jure bound to be part of the EU’s inner core
like Finland. However, the country is yet to join the third
stage of the EMU, following the result of the 2003 non-
binding referendum on the matter which was driven by
internal divisions within the Swedish Social Democratic
Party. This triggered an unprecedented form of de facto
differentiation, as Sweden’s decision not to join the
Eurozone was tolerated by the European Commission.
This model was followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland. However, the Swedish model of differentia-
tion is unstable as it relies on political will (i.e., tolerated
by Brussels) and not on legal grounds.
In contrast, Finland has been considered a core EU
member state ever since it joined in 1995. Similar to
non-aligned Austria joining the EU in the same year, the
end of the Cold War provided Finland with the oppor-
tunity to apply for EU membership and thereby geopo-
litically step out of the Cold War shadow—which had
forced the country to maintain close ties with the Soviet
Union as a consequence of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship
and Mutual Assistance. Finland entered a phase of “EU
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honeymoon” (Ojanen, 2005) pioneering important ex-
ternal relations initiatives in the field of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy as well as the EU’s Northern
Dimension to draw Russia closer to the EU. Most im-
portantly, it was amongst the founding members of
the Eurozone signaling the country’s ambition to leave
its peripheral destiny and become part of the EU’s in-
ner circle. In the aftermath of the Euro-crisis and the
rise of the Eurosceptic Finns Party, some political voices
(mostly within this party) uttered the idea of leaving
the Eurozone without leaving the EU. More recently,
the Finnish government has been eager to position it-
self closer to countries like the Netherlands and Austria,
which are adamant in preserving financial rigor in light
of discussions on how to support those EU member
states who have been affected most severally by the
Covid-19 pandemic.
Historically, Nordic Cooperation has not only al-
ways been restricted to low politics but also rather
selective—perhaps reiterating broader European inte-
gration. As such, over the past three decades, the Nordic
countries have played an important role in shaping differ-
entiation in the EU, either by seeking a close relationship
with the EU as outsiders (Norway and Iceland) or seek-
ing de facto (Sweden) or de jure (Denmark) opt-outs of
the EU. This shows that European integration falls out-
side the so-called Nordic or even Scandinavian model
of government (see Arter, 2008). Although we have as-
signed the emblematic term of ‘model’ to three of the
Scandinavian countries, wewould issue a note of caution
in applying them beyond these cases in a more generic
sense. It only holds for the Norwegian and Danish model
in that these patterns of relations with the EU are under-
pinned in legal terms by the EEA agreement in case of
Norway and by the acceptance of de jure differentiation
in the case of Denmark.
3. Nordic Party Families and Their Positions on
Differentiation in the EU
The five Nordic political systems share a series of
common characteristics. Among these is the preva-
lence of similar and well-established party families
which predominantly compete on a left-right dimen-
sion (Grendstad, 2003), and a strong sense of cooper-
ation among the five states, as illustrated by the long-
lasting collaboration between parties through the Nordic
Council (Olsen& Sverdrup, 1998).While the Nordic party
systems have been prone to ‘earthquake’ elections in
the 1970s, early 1990s and late 2000s (Knutsen, 2004), it
has become widely accepted that eight well-established
party families are present in these countries.
Table 1 offers an overview of the different Nordic
party families. It is worth noting that some countries (es-
pecially Iceland) have seen the emergence of new polit-
ical parties over the past few years; these parties have
not been taken into consideration within the framework
of this study as it is deemed too early to determine
whether they will have a lasting impact on the Nordic
party system, as demonstrated by the mixed fortunes of
the Swedish and Icelandic Pirate parties.
At the transnational level, however, cooperation be-
tween Nordic political parties does not systematically fol-
low ideological preferences. Table 2 summarizes party af-
filiations in the Nordic Council and at Euro-Party levels.
Overall, affiliations mirror party families, but there are
Table 1. List of well-established political parties in the Nordic countries, per party family.
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Conservative Conservative National Coalition Independence Conservative Party Moderate Party
People’s Party Party Party
Social Social Democrats Social Democratic Social Democratic Labour Party Social Democratic
Democratic Party Alliance Party
Agrarian Venstre Centre Party Progressive Party Centre Party Centre Party
Christian N/A (no national Christian N/A (non-existent) Christian Christian
Democratic seats since 2005) Democrats Democratic Party Democrats
Liberal Danish Social Swedish People’s N/A (new parties Liberal Party Liberal People’s
Liberal Party Party since 2016) Party
Socialist Left Red-Green Left Alliance Left-Green Socialist Left Party Left Party
Alliance Movement
Green Socialist People’s Green League N/A (covered by Green Party Green Party
Party the Left-Green (national seat
Movement) since 2013)
Populist Radical Danish People’s Finns Party N/A (none) Progress Party Sweden
Right Party Democrats
Note: Authors’ own compilation.
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Table 2. Nordic Party cooperation and affiliation in the Nordic Council and in the European Parliament.
Party family Affiliation level Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Conservative Euro-Party European People’s Party European People’s Party European Conservatives European People’s Party European People’s Party
and Reformists Party (associated)
Nordic Council Conservative Group Conservative Group Conservative Group Conservative Group Conservative Group
Social Democratic Euro-Party Party of European Party of European Party of European Party of European Party of European
Socialists Socialists Socialists Socialists Socialists
Nordic Council Social Democrat Group Social Democrat Group Social Democrat Group Social Democrat Group Social Democrat Group
Agrarian Euro-Party ALDE party ALDE Party Unaffiliated Unaffiliated ALDE Party
Nordic Council Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group
Christian Euro-Party European People’s Party European People’s Party European People’s Party
Democratic (observer)
Nordic Council Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group
Liberal Euro-Party ALDE Party ALDE Party ALDE Party ALDE Party
Nordic Council Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group Centre Group
Socialist Left Euro-Party European Left/Nordic European Left/Nordic Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left
Green Left Green Left
Nordic Council Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left
Green Euro-Party European Greens European Greens European Greens European Greens
Nordic Council Nordic Green Left Centre Group Not represented Centre Group
Populist Radical Euro-Party Identity & Democracy Identity & Democracy Unaffiliated European Conservatives
Right (associated) (associated) and Reformists Party
Nordic Council Nordic Freedom Nordic Freedom Unaffiliated Nordic Freedom
Note: Authors’ own compilation, based on data available from the European Parliament and Nordic Council’s websites.
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some exceptions. Parties that do not follow the pattern
of their ‘sister’ parties are highlighted. This is the case
of the Icelandic Independence Party, which joined the
soft Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists
Party founded by David Cameron in 2009; the Icelandic
Progressive and Norwegian Centre Parties, which are
not affiliated with any Euro-Parties; and the Finnish and
Swedish Greens, which are part of the Nordic Council’s
Centre Group rather than the Nordic Green Left. This ta-
ble also shows there is no clear pattern of collaboration
betweenNordic populist radical right parties, despite the
existence of the Nordic Freedom group in the Nordic
Council. This is not a new phenomenon, as there have
been some ideological divisions between these parties as
well as reputational concerns with regards to being asso-
ciated with parties that have an extreme right past (i.e.,
the Sweden Democrats; seeMcDonnell &Werner, 2018).
As Nordic Council party groups and Euro-Parties tend
to share a similar political agenda, one could presume
that overall (besides the aforementioned exceptions),
parties belonging to the same family would share the
same position on European integration. The following
sub-sections summarize the empirical findings of our
study in comparative perspective.
3.1. Social Democratic Parties
Across all five Nordic countries, the social democrats do
not appear to share a common viewon European cooper-
ation. In Finland, EU membership and further European
integration—in all policy areas—have been perceived for
quite some time to be largely positive, amongst the party
elites as well as amongst the grassroots. The only signs of
reluctance were related to developments of the CFSP in
the early 2000s (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue,
2003). Yet, the Finnish Social Democrats have not advo-
cated for differentiation in EU integration as there is a
broad consensus within the party regarding the benefits
of belonging in the inner core of the EU. The same ap-
plies to the Danish Social Democrats, whose position on
European integration was constrained by the outcome
of the initial referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and
subsequent referendums on transforming opt-outs into
opt-ins (see e.g., Svensson, 2002). In Iceland, while the
Social Democratic Alliance initially agreed that the EEA
offered a good compromise for the country’s relation-
ship with the EU, the situation changed with the finan-
cial crisis in 2008 (Jonsdottir, 2013). Under the leadership
of Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, the party politicized the issue
of EU membership as a response to the financial crisis,
and eventually submitted a formal application after win-
ning the early general election in 2009. In Sweden and
Norway, however, the situation is more complex. Both
social democratic parties have suffered from strong in-
ternal divisions over membership in the EU in particular
and not over European integration more generally, and
signs of Euroscepticism are perceptible on several lev-
els: among its grassroots members, the elites, the mem-
bers of parliament (MPs), and among appointed minis-
ters when in government. An example of such divisions
was illustrated in the question of Sweden’s participation
in the third stage of the EMU, which led the party to
adopt a strategy of compartmentalization and allowed
anti-Euromembers to campaign for the ‘no’ camp, which
eventually played an important role in shaping the out-
come of the 2003 referendum (Aylott, 2005). In Norway,
the Labour Party’s position was mostly constrained by
the outcome of the 1994 membership referendum, al-
though the party has ever after sought active collabora-
tion with the EU:
[I]n our programme, we say that the best would have
been for Norway to be member of the European
Union, because that would have made us also a part
of the political project and give us influence over deci-
sions which concern us, but we are also a party where
there are different views on this issue….After the 1994
referendum…every time the EU has expended its co-
operation, we wanted to participate, and we would
want to go for further integration. (Norwegian Labour
Party MP, interview, October 23, 2012)
3.2. Conservative Parties
In contrast to the Social Democratic party family,
Conservative parties are far more united on questions re-
lated to the EU and European integration. In Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden, conservative parties tend
to share similar positions in terms of support for fur-
ther European integration; they strongly support full EU
membership and believe that their respective country
should belong to the ‘inner core’ of the Union. As such,
differentiated European integration is not seen as a vi-
able option or as a likely alternative for their respective
countries. This position is also shared by a majority of
the party members and by conservative MPs. Within the
Norwegian Conservative party, EEA membership is con-
sidered as “not as a good alternative, but a good tool,
as a necessary step for us towards membership” (two
spokespersons from the Norwegian Conservative Party,
interview, November 7, 2012). It is however worth not-
ing that EU membership has been a non-salient issue for
the Norwegian Conservatives since the late 1990s (see
Fossum, 2010). By contrast, this has not been the case in
Iceland,where the IndependencePartymarked its strong
opposition to Iceland’s application for EU membership
in the late 2000s. When returning to power in 2013,
the party (together with the agrarian Progressive Party)
opted to freeze and eventually halt accession talks with
the EU. Yet, the level of cohesionwithin the Conservative
Party family is higher than for the Social Democrats.
3.3. Christian Democratic Parties
Compared both to social democratic and conservative
parties, Christian Democratic parties are not as well-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 89–99 94
established across all Nordic countries, and they are not
even effectively represented in their national parliament
in Iceland and as the Danish Christian Democrats since
2005. Moreover, the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish
Christian Democratic parties diverge in their views on
European integration, even though interviewees suggest
there are no significant internal divisions on the matter
and that European integration is not a salient issue to
them. In Finland, alongside the Finns Party, the party is
considered to be the most well-established party oppos-
ing EU participation in several policy areas, but without
rejecting EUmembership per se. The party is particularly
critical of participation in the Eurozone and in the CFSP. In
Sweden, however, the Christian Democrats campaigned
in favor of EU membership in the early 1990s and have
supported full involvement in all EU policy areas since
2000, including in the Eurozone. Finally, the Norwegian
Christian Democrats have adopted a much more prag-
matic position. The party has always opposed EU mem-
bership but at the same time advocated for a close co-
operation with Brussels in several policy areas while also
safeguarding national sovereignty, such as through par-
ticipation in Schengen:
[W]e need cooperation on security and justice and
fighting crime, and so on, and that is what Schengen
is all about. So I think our party has considered it as
a tool to achieve those needs of cooperation but we
also see some challenges, such as the lack of control of
our own borders. (Policy Adviser from the Norwegian
Christian Democratic Party, interview, July 17, 2013)
As such, the party supports Norway’s position in the ‘in-
ner periphery’ of the Union. These three parties thus dif-
fer remarkably regarding their support for European in-
tegration, demonstrating again that parties belonging to
the same family may display diverging views on Europe.
3.4. Agrarian Parties
Much like the social democratic party family, the Nordic
agrarian parties have also been divided and do not share
common positions on European integration. In Norway,
the Centre Party appears to be one among the most
Eurosceptic parties as it is strongly opposed to any kind
of institutionalised relations with Brussels, preferring
“an all-European cooperation between independent na-
tions” based on the principles of international law (see
e.g., Senterpartiet, 1993). In Iceland, the Progressive
Party rejected calls to join the EU after the financial cri-
sis in 2008 and contributed to freezing talks when com-
ing back in government with the Independence Party in
2013. This may explain why neither of the parties are
affiliated to any Euro-Party, in contrast to agrarian par-
ties in the remaining three Nordic countries: These are
members of the pro-European Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe. While in Denmark Venstre is a
pro-European party that does not advocate differentia-
tion in EU integration, in Finland and Sweden these par-
ties have been characterized by significant internal divi-
sions on the issue. Furthermore, their party leaderships
have often promoted differentiated integration by ad-
vocating EU membership but rejecting participation in
some highly politicised policy areas, especially the EMU
anddevelopments in the CFSP. Asmentioned by a Finnish
Member of Parliament from the Centre Party, the party’s
initial opposition towards joining the Eurozone was:
A rather easy decision, as not many MPs in my party
would have preferred to vote for joining the EMU, be-
cause we were not in the government, and because
the actual decision to join the European Union was
so difficult [due to internal divisions]. (Finnish Centre
Party MP, interview, May 22, 2013)
Such intra-party divisions are further illustrated by the
decision made by 22 out of 55 Centre Party MPs to vote
against submitting Finland’s application for EU member-
ship in 1992 (Karttunen, 2009). In Sweden, the Centre
Party’s preference for differentiation in EU integration
was also highlighted by an interviewee: “[W]e would
like to see different types of integration within Europe.
We could have a multi-core Union so to speak. So, more
integration on some issues but less integration on some
others” (spokesperson from the Swedish Centre Party, in-
terview, April 7, 2014). In sum, Nordic agrarian parties
do not share a common vision on European integration,
with the Danish Venstre being the only party in this fam-
ily fully committed to the idea of European integration.
3.5. Socialist Left Parties
As successors from former communist parties (with the
exception of the Icelandic Left-Green Movement), the
Nordic Socialist Left parties have generally tended to be
opposed to European integration. In Finland, Norway,
and Sweden, they were strongly opposed to joining the
EU in the early 1990s. However, when it comes to sup-
port for cooperation within the EU in particular policy
areas, their views tend to differ. The Swedish Left and
the Norwegian Socialist Left parties have generally been
the most critical and almost unanimously rejected any
kind of institutionalised cooperation within the frame-
work of the EU, which is mostly seen as a neoliberal tool.
In Finland, however, the Left Alliance has adopted amore
nuanced and pragmatic attitude. In the early 1990s, the
party failed to adopt a common position on EU mem-
bership, which demonstrates the strong internal party
divisions on this issue. Subsequently, the party came to
change its stance towards European integration and be-
came much more positive. Despite significant internal
oppositions, it even supported EMU membership in or-
der to remain in government. In subsequent years, the
Left Alliance has remained opposed to participation in
the CFSP. The Icelandic Left-Green Movement has also
changed its position over time. In 2009, the party formed
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the first left-wing coalition government in the country’s
history with the Social Democratic Alliance, and even
though the party was mostly opposed to the idea, they
accepted to submit a formal application for EU member-
ship in 2009 before reverting back to its original pro-EEA
stance in 2013. This temporal and short-lived switch was
explained by a former Left-Green Movement MP:
First, the party has the opinion that Iceland is bet-
ter outside the EU than inside. Second, we wanted to
facilitate a broad democratic open discussion in the
Icelandic society on the pros and cons of EU member-
ship. And third, we want the Icelandic people to de-
cide in a referendum on the future relations of the EU.
(Left-Green Movement MP, interview, June 1, 2011)
3.6. Green Parties
The Green parties across the Nordic region have also
been divided on European integration. In Finland, the
Green League has shared a position similar to the one
by the Socialist Left Alliance until the early 2000s, and
they presented no official position on EU membership
when the debate surfaced in the early 1990s. They were
initially opposed to an EMU membership, before chang-
ing their position in order to stay in government; and
they also opposed developments relating to the CFSP.
However, from 2003 onwards the party has started to be-
comemore pro-integrationist and has supported cooper-
ation within the EU in most policy areas. In Sweden, the
Greens have been, and to some extent continue to be,
largely opposed to European integration. The party op-
posed EUmembership from the early 1990s onwards un-
til 2008when it removed the ‘withdrawal clause’ from its
party manifesto. It also opposed most developments at
the EU level—including participation in the third stage of
the EMU—but has increasingly come to accept Sweden’s
EUmembership. In Norway, the younger Green Party (es-
tablished in 1988) favours active relationships with the
EU while advocating reforms to the current EEA agree-
ment in order to make it more transparent and focused
on climate policy and the European ´Green Deal´. In
Denmark, the Socialist People’s Party opposed the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty before changing its party
position given the role it played to draft the Edinburgh
Agreement. The party has supported the existing Danish
opt-outs from their membership of the EU since then.
3.7. Populist Radical Right Parties
As outlined above, the Nordic populist radical right par-
ties have had a tumultuous relationship over the past
decades, although all but the Norwegian Progress party
cooperate in the Nordic Council. Unsurprisingly, they
are united in their broad opposition to the process of
European integration. Yet the scope of such opposition
ought to be explored further, as key differences between
Nordic parties are noticeable. The Progress Partywas the
only Norwegian political party to not have adopted an
official position on EU membership ahead of the 1994
membership referendum. Since then it has supported
Norwegian participation in the EU through the EEA agree-
ment. The Finns Party has beenmore critical to European
integration than its Norwegian counterpart. The party
(and more specifically its predecessor, the Rural Party)
was opposed to EUmembership, but subsequently came
to accept the result of the 1994 EU membership referen-
dum to join as full EU members and has not called for
withdrawing Finland from the Union afterwards. More
specifically, however, the Finns Party has been strongly
opposed to developments in the CFSP, the AFSJ, and par-
ticipation in the EMU but never formally sought a with-
drawal from the bloc:
[W]e would like to renew the Union, to make it work
better. If the Commission does not want to do it, then
we might have to change our line, but at the moment
we would like Finland to remain in the Union. (Finns
Party MP, interview, May 21, 2013)
Since 2019, under Jussi Halla-Aho’s leadership (which led
to the emergence of a splinter party, Blue Reform), the
party has become more critical and now calls for Finland
to leave the Eurozone. As far as the Sweden Democrats
are concerned, it should be noted that the party’s suc-
cess is more recent than in other Nordic countries, mean-
ing it did not play a significant role in the 1994 EU mem-
bership referendum. Since the early 2000s, the Sweden
Democrats have embraced an ambiguous approach to
the Swedish ‘EU debate,’ ranging from support for the ex-
isting de facto Swedish opt-outs from the EU to advocat-
ing a ‘Swexit’ in 2018 following the outcome of the Brexit
referendum (Leruth et al., 2019). In Denmark, the Danish
People’s Party has been in favour of the existing de jure
Danish opt-outs from the EU, but since the Brexit vote,
the party has becomedivided overwhether it should sup-
port a Danish withdrawal from the EU altogether, or not.
The party’s official position has, however, been to remain
within the EU but to play a role alongside other parties in
the Identity & Democracy group to reform the EU into a
Europe of Nations. In sum, although the Nordic populist
radical right parties’ position on European integration is
(broadly speaking) Eurosceptic, we see significant points
of divergence both across and within the parties.
4. Conclusion: No Nordic Model of Party Cooperation
on EU Matters
The EU has always been a moving target and an evolving
building-site of European political order (Olsen, 2007).
It has also become an increasingly mixed order char-
acterized by differentiation (be it differentiated integra-
tion or, more recently, disintegration; Gänzle et al., 2020;
Schimmelfennig, 2018). Although the support and oppo-
sition towards European integration by Nordic political
parties used to be measured on their views on EU mem-
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bership, there can be significant distinctions between po-
litical parties belonging to the same Nordic party fam-
ily. This article has compared Nordic party positions on
European integration and differentiation by using party
manifestos as well as interviews conducted with high-
level party fonctionnaires.
Four sets of findings can be distinguished. Firstly,
belonging to a Nordic party family does not impact
on a party’s position on European integration. There is
no unified position on Europe among these parties, al-
though the Conservative party family is overall more
pro-European than other Nordic party families (with
the exception of the Eurosceptic Independence Party
in Iceland).
Secondly, some factors shaping party positions have
been identified, and these strongly vary depending on
the respective domestic contexts. For some political par-
ties, government participation played an important role
(e.g., the Finnish Green League and Left Alliance). For
others, public opinion constrained their positions, espe-
cially with regards to deeper European integration (e.g.,
theNorwegian Conservative Party or theDanish Venstre).
Intra-party divisions also play a role, especially within
the Nordic Social Democratic party family, or the Finnish
Centre Party’s deep divisions regarding Finland’s applica-
tion for EU membership.
Thirdly, Nordic cooperation between political parties
at a transnational level does not lead them to adopt a
common position, thus suggesting that domestic factors
matter more than pan-European ones of party-political
preferences on European integration.
Finally, party positions on European integration are
dynamic rather than fixed. This is particularly the case
for the Nordic populist radical right party family, as these
political parties have adapted their official position over
time and thus within varying domestic political contexts,
especially when crises arise.
In terms of future or complimentary research needs,
it might be worthwhile first to embrace more recent
data covering the implications of the so-called refugee
crisis of the past decade (culminating in 2015) as well
as the implications of the ongoing (at the time of writ-
ing) Covid-19 pandemic; and second, to establish towhat
extent alternative routes for cooperation—such as in-
terparliamentary meetings and conferences (for exam-
ple the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for
Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU) or parliamen-
tary meetings at sub-regional level, such as in the con-
text of Nordic or ‘Northern’ organizations, like the par-
liamentary assembly of the Baltic Sea States Subregional
Cooperation—are being used to adjust party positions, if
at all.
By all means, the late 2010s have seen the emer-
gence of a new ‘Northern’ group of reluctant Europeans,
the ‘Frugal Four,’ which includes two of the three Nordic
EU member-states, namely Denmark and Sweden, shar-
ing sideswith theNetherlands and Austria—and recently
supported by Finland. Austrian Chancellor Sebastian
Kurz is adamant in turning this group into a more perma-
nent structure in order to counter the resurged promi-
nence of the Franco-German coalition in EU decision-
making. Howpermanent and stable this groupwill be still
remains to be seen. By all means, it is following in the
footsteps of the Hanseatic League of Eurozone member
stateswhich are conservative in termsof fiscal policy (see
Schulz & Henökl, 2020). As discussions over the future of
Europe in a post-Brexit and post-Covid-19 era loom large,
it remains yet to be seen whether Nordic divisions over
European integration will intensify.
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